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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

RANIER f.

HUCK,

Plaintiff-Appellant,
vs.

Case No. 19180

PATRICIA ANN HUCK,
Defendant-Respondent.

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF
NATURE OF CASE
This is an appeal from a Decree of Divorce entered by
the Third Judicial District Court in and for Salt Lake County,
State of Utah.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The lower court awarded defendant a Decree of
Divorce, together with certain properties acquired during the
marriage, custody of the minor child, temporary alimony, child
support and attorneys'

fees.

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Defendant-Respondent respectfully requests this Court
affirm the District Court's determination as contained in the
Decree of Divorce entered herein.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Respondent is willing to accept certain of the
statements of fact prcpounded by appellant, but not the
conclusions drawn therefrom.

Many additional statements of
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fact are contained in the appellant's arg~ments which cannot be
accepted by respondent.

Respondent 3oes not believe th3t the

facts in this case are so uniquely different as to justify the
application of a different set of standards governing the
review of domestic cases.

While every factual situation is

unique to some extent, for purposes of reviewing the lower
court's determination, there appears to be little difference
between this marriage failure and the majority of domestic
cases reviewed by this Honorable Court.
The parties were married for legitimate social and
emotional reasons.

Their relationship withered to a point of

separation and divorce.

During the course of that marriage,

the parties borne a child, acquired marital properties and
investments, incurred obligations, and lived and progressed as
any couple may be expected to develop.
The respondent not only contributed as a mother to
the parties' child and a wife to the appellant (R.632), but
also contributed her earning capacity while at the same time
furthering her education and career potentials.

The appellant,

although highly educated as a Ph.D in Physics, continued his
educational interests more as a hobby than an economic

~ursoit,

and admittedly invested substantial amounts of time managing,
developing and maintaining real estate rental investments.
That was his avocation and occupation.

During the course of

the marr:age, by reason of the appellant's eDployrnent efforts
and the respondent's financial contribution to offset normal
family expenditures, the assets of the parties substantially
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increased.

Defendant's Exhibit 9 demonstrated 19 categories of

family expenses maintained and paid by Patricia Huck during the
course of this marriage.

In addition, the defendant paid all

child care and medical expenses.

These contributions allowed

the plaintiff to save and reinvest income in rental properties,
thus increasing overall equity.

Patricia's contributions to

the marraige were not by "ag•eement", as that term is implied
by the plaintiff, unless plaintiff means the agreements
repeated upon the marriage vows, one to another.
During the pendency of the proceedings below,
defendant moved with her child to her home state of California
to secure employment and be close to her family.

(R.624.)

She

obtaimed temporary employment as an all-night laboratory
technician at a local hospital working three ten-hour shifts.
Her net income was not sufficient to meet her monthly needs of
$1,700.00 per month without the temporary support awarded by
the court.

(R.626-628.)
ARGUMENT
I.

THE COURT DID NOT COMMIT ERROR BY INVALIDATING OR DISREGARDING THE PRENUPTIAL
AGREEMENT.

As restated in appellant's brief, the court found

(a)

the prenuptial agreement was coercive and therefore invalid,
and

(b) even if not invalid, the prenuptial agreement had been

met in all of its operational terms and conditions.

The

finding 3nd conclusion of the court and its effect should be
left to the sound discretion of the trial court whose
discretion should not be reversed unless there i2 a clear
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demonstration of arbitrary and capri::i')\JC c'rn'1'J 'C ,)n t:1e part
of the court.

English v. English,

Naylor v. Naylor, 563 P.2d 184

565 ?.2d 409

(IJL1h "9771;

(Utah 1q77).

The prenuptial agreement itself provides that if the
parties should divorce during the first two years of marriage,
then certain limitations to claims will be effective
4 of plaintiff's Exhibit 1).

(paragraph

The agreement is silent if the

marriage lasts longer than two years, which this marriage did.
The agreement further provides that Patricia Huck is
to provide all child support payments unless she can't afford
it or is not "capable of self-support at such time".

The court

specifically found that during the pendency of these
proceedings, defendant was in fact not capable of such
self-support.

This finding is supported by a finding

concerning her earnings, his earnings, as well as the
availability of cash and capital resources.
The appellant argued that Patricia Huck would not
have been entitled to temporary alimony if the prenuptial
agreement were valid.

Even this contention is not consistent

with the terms of the prenuptial agreement:
6.
In the event of divorce or separation,
Pat specifically waives alimony or separate
maintenance support provided that she is capable
of self-support at such time.
(Plaintiff's
Exhibit 1.)
Nowhere in his argument does the plaintiff recognize
defendant's expenditures,

the financial burden of rearing a

child, and the higher expenses made necessary by her move to
California.

The plaintiff simply
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resta~~s

in his brief that

the defendant's gross earnings should qualify her as a
self-supporting person.
sta~e,

The move to California, her home

was made necessary to secure a stable and long-term

empl~yment

opportunity.

Her employment hours are consistent

with full-time night laboratory work and her expenses, as
testified, were within reasonable limits given the locality of
her employment, schooling and the like.

Accordingly, the court

found she was not capable of self-support and was in need of
alimony and child support.
Every aspect of the prenuptial agreement was complied
with by the Court:
(1)

All property brought into the marriage by each

party remained the property of that party.

Ranier Huck

recognized in the Pretrial Order that Patricia Huck brought in
a great deal more to the marriage than the mere $1,000.0C
recited in the agreement

(~Pretrial

Order, R.261).

Ranier

Huck received all property listed in Exhibit "A" to the
prenuptial agreement;
(2)

In the event of divorce, if the parties could

not agree on a division of property, the agreement provided
that a court of law should divide the same, just as it did in
this matter;
(3)

Patricia Huck received custody of her child,

even though Ranier Huck did not originally want to be bound by
his agreement not to claim any custody under the prenuptial
agreement.

Under Utah law, such an agreement would not bind

the court.
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Consistent with the agreement,

th0

att •mpterl to

co~rt

divide marital properties in an equitahle mJnner

1~

or.ler

to

achieve a happy and useful result to all parties concerned.
The court exercised its discretion without abuse and in a
manner completely consistent with the prenuptial agreement.
Thus, the court found that the plaintiff was not prejudiced in
any manner by the court's finding that the defendant was
coerced into executing the prenuptial agreement.
coercion, although addressed by the court,

II.

The issue of

is moot.

THE COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION
IN AWARDING DEFENDANT ATTORNEYS' FEES.

Plaintiff argues that because of a substantial
marital property award to the defendant, and because
defendant's net income would thus increase once she became
possessed of that real property, the defendant could well
afford to pay her own attorneys'

fees,

and thus plaintiff

should not have been ordered to contribute the net amount of

$2,750.00 toward payment of attorneys' fees.

Plaintiff's

argument is further exaggerated by recapping a long history of
the defendant's "defense" of certain legal maneuvers designed
to boot her out of house and home, and by an ultimately
unsuccessful attempt to disqualify plaintiff's attorney from
continuing to represent the plaintiff.
The court made substantial findings demonstrating the
amount of monies available to each party:

the fact that

plaintiff had available in his possession in excess of

$19,000.00 from the sale of marital property; the fact that
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plaintiff had substantial liquid savings accounts under his
name and in his sole possession and control; the fact that
plaintiff had all income-producing properties in his name and
under his control

(the properties awarded defendant have still

not been turned over to her as of the date of this brief); and
the fact that defendant maintained herself and the minor child
solely on her net income and temporary support.
The defendant, Patricia Huck, still believes that had
her attempts to disqualify the plaintiff's attorney been
successful, this matter would not have been litigated to the
extent that it was.

Indeed, the plaintiff's interests, held

jointly with his attorney, were significant enough to warrant
protection while at the same time cloud the judgment of both
client and attorney.

Although unsuccessful, Patricia Ruck

believes that her attempts were necessary for her own
protection.
Defendant's attorney testified to the number of
hours, the fee per hour, his experience in domestic trial
relations, and the reasonableness of the fee.

The only issue

raised at trial by plaintiff concerns the number of hours and
on what tasks these hours were expended.

The court obviously

weighed the facts in arriving at an award of attorneys' fees of
approximately one-third of what had been requested.
is

c~early

The award

within the court's discretion and supported by the

findings and facts in evidence and should be accordingly
sustained.
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III.

THE LOWER COURT COM:.!ITTED NO ERROR IN
AWARDING DEFENDANT CERTAI~ PROPERTTES
AND AN EQUITABLE DIVISTON OF MARITAL
PROPERTY.

In accordance with the prenuptial agreement, the
parties ultimately stipulated that each would be awarded the
various properties belonging to them at the inception of this
marriage.

That rule was consistent with the prenuptial

agreement and general domestic relations law.
Preston, 646 P.2d 705
P.2d 326

(Utah 1980).

law, inviable.

Preston v.

(Utah 1982); Jesperson v. Jesperson, 610
However, that rule is not, under Utah

Workman v. Workman, 652 P.2d 931 (Utah 1982).

Indeed, any increase in the value of separate property which
occurs during the marriage is considered to be acquired through
the joint effort of the parties under Utah law.

In such cases,

the spouse will be entitled to the value of assets contributed
at the time of the marriage and the profits due to the increase
will be divided as a marital asset.
Jesperson v. Jesperson, supra.

Preston v. Preston,

~;

Thus, the defendant was awarded

three real properties, having a combined total equity of
approximately $76,000.00, which total equity included any
credits for premarital properties belonging to her in the
stipulated amount of $8,000.00.

Compare plaintiff's award, in

excess of $120,000.00 of properties, not including the
premarital contributions and not including premarital
properties held, stipulated to be plaintiff's separate
property.

It is clear that the plaintiff received by far the

larger amount of property available for distribution.
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He has

not demonstrated, nor can he, any abuse of discretion by the
lower court in its treatment and distribution of marital
[Jroperty.

Fletcher v. Fletcher, 615 P.2d 931 (Utah 1982).
The plaintiff further contends, however, that even if

the

d~stribution

of these properties was within the fair and

equitable discretion of the court, the defendant should be
estopped from claiming any value in the marriage whatsoever by
reason of her conduct and by reason of the various statements
made to the plaintiff throughout the marriage.

Defendant

responds, as she did at the trial, by denying these estoppal
statements, which the court found in her favor, and by
emphasizing the admitted irresponsibility and selfishness of
the plaintiff.

At page 39 of appellant's brief, appellant

recites as a fact "it was agreed prior to the marriage that
should the marriage end in divorce, she would make no claim as
to the pre-existing properties in any way.

(Tr. 462.)"

This

quotation leaves the Court with an impression consistent with
the plaintiff's assertion that the marriage was solely a
marriage of convenience and that defendant would have been
willing to pay for this convenience if necessary.

Reading one

page further into the transcript, however, produces a more
rational clarification when the trial court asked Mr. Huck his
position regarding improvements made to the marital residence
after the marriage:
THE COURT:
Supposing they proved to my
satisfaction that that is the case, was it your
[Mr. Huck] intention that you would take the
f~ll benefit of those improvements?
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ANSWER [by Mr. Huck]:
I don't think that W')dld
be reasonable, no.
I would w1nt to be f3ir.
THE COURT:

I don't either.

Thank you.

The plaintiff's actions in eavesdropping on
defendant's telephone conversations is further evidence of
plaintiff's notions of fairness.

The conversation quoted at

pages 44 and 45 of appellant's brief is taken out of context
(bragging to a friend),

and represents three separate

conversations taken at different times and discussing different
subjects.

While the plaintiff did not deny the conversations

themselves, the intent,

import and meaning of these

conversations were denied as not being consistent with those
advanced by the plaintiff.
These conversations are the only evidence which
support plaintiff's selfish arguments that only he contributed
to the growth of marital property and that

~rs.

specifically waived any claim to such property.

Huck
This

contention is not even consistent with the prenuptial agreement
which provides:

3. It is agreed by both parties that upon
divorce or legal separation, a mutual agreement
as to the disbursement of property acquired
after the marriage shall be made by the parties
themselves or, in the event that they cannot
agree, that they shall allow a court of law to
divide such property under the court's
discretion.
That is what the court did.
The court answered plaintiff's arguments of w3iver
and estoppel by awarding property co the deferdant, as it did.
The court thus

i~plicitly

found that there was neither an
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explicit or implicit waiver of a known right, either
voluntarily by the defendant or by the defendant's actions and
deeds.

The entire estoppel argument is simply an excuse to

justify plaintiff's financial greed.
CONCLUSION
Patricia Ann Huck respectfully requests this Court
affirm the lower court's determinations in all respects and
deny any relief requested by the plaintiff-appellant.

The

lower court's determinations are, in all respects, supported by
the evidence in the record and are not an abuse of the court's
discretion or a misapplication of law.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 6th day of February, 1984.
GIAUQUE & WILLIAMS

Attorney for Defendant-Respondent

0701L
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICS

A true and correct copy of RESPONDENT'S BRIEF was
placed in the United States mail, postage prepaid, to Craig S.
Cook, Esq., Attorney for Plaintiff-Appellant, 3645 East 3100
South, Salt Lake City, Utah 84109, on this
February, 1984.
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